Le séminaire Fourgeaud du 3 mars 2022 a eu pour thème Les dettes souveraines.
Ce séminaire était présidé par Agnès Bénassy-Quéré (PSE et DG Trésor).
Tout d'abord, Charles Serfaty (Banque de France) a présenté une étude intitulée "Sovereign Default and International Trade".
Ensuite, le Professeur Ugo Panizza (The Graduate Institute, Geneva & CEPR) a présenté les principaux enseignements d'une étude menée avec Francesca Caselli (Fonds monétaire international), Matilde Faralli (Imperial College London) et Paolo Manasse (Université de Bologne) intitulée "On the Benefits of Repaying".
La discussion a été introduite par Schwan Badirou Gafari (Secrétaire Général du Club de Paris).
1er exposé : présentation orale de Charles Serfaty
Sovereign Default and International Trade : papier de Charles Serfaty
2nd exposé : présentation orale du Professeur Ugo Panizza
On the Benefits of Repaying : papier de Francesca Caselli, Matilde Faralli, Paolo Manasse et Ugo Panizza
Voici un bref résumé des études présentées (en anglais) :
‘‘Sovereign Default and International Trade’’ by Charles Serfaty (Banque de France).
Evidence suggests that sovereign defaults disrupt international trade. As a consequence, countries that are more open have more to lose from a sovereign default and are less inclined to renege on their debt. In turn, lenders should trust more open countries and charge them lower interest rate. In most cases, the country should also borrow more debt the more open it is. This paper formalizes this idea in a simple sovereign debt model à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). It also provides evidence using gravitational instrumental variables from Frankel and Romer (1999) and Feyrer (2019) as a source for exogenous variation for trade openness.
‘‘On the Benefits of Repaying’’ by Francesca Caselli (International Monetary Fund), Matilde Faralli (Imperial College London), Paolo Manasse (University of Bologna) and Ugo Panizza (The Graduate Institute, Geneva & CEPR)
This paper studies whether countries benefit from servicing their debts during times of widespread sovereign defaults. Colombia is typically regarded as the only large Latin American country that did not default in the 1980s. Using archival research and formal econometric estimates of Colombia’s probability of default, we show that in the early 1980s Colombia’s fundamentals were not significantly different from those of the Latin American countries that defaulted on their debts. We also document that the different path chosen by Colombia was due to the authorities’ belief that maintaining a good reputation in the international capital market would have substantial long-term payoffs. We show that the case of Colombia is more complex than what it is commonly assumed. Although Colombia had to re-profile its debts, high-level political support from the US allowed Colombia to do so outside the standard framework of an IMF program. Our counterfactual analysis shows that in the short to medium run, Colombia benefited from avoiding an explicit default. Specifically, we find that GDP growth in the 1980s was higher than that of a counterfactual in which Colombia behaved like its neighboring countries. We also test whether Colombia’s behavior in the 1980s led to long-term reputational benefits. Using an event study based on a large sudden stop, we find no evidence for such long-lasting reputational gains.