Trésor-Info - Publications de la direction générale du Trésor - World

The Role of Carbon Credits in Financing Global Climate Goals

2025-11-25T00:00:00+01:00

Carbon credits are financial instruments aimed at supporting greenhouse gas emission reduction or carbon removal projects, especially in developing countries. Businesses use them to offset some of the emissions generated by their operations (offsetting) or to demonstrate their environmental commitment (contribution), for example by funding afforestation projects.

Carbon credits, which help to raise private-sector funding for climate initiatives, are instruments that can be used alongside, but are distinct from, emission trading schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

In 2024, around $500m in credits were traded on carbon credit markets globally. These markets are experiencing a crisis due to supply-side quality issues as well as challenges to the credibility of the principle of offsetting emissions owing to several greenwashing scandals. Several public- and private-sector initiatives are nevertheless seeking to better regulate practices to ensure the market’s credibility and real climate benefits. The establishment of an international carbon credit trading scheme is foreseen by the Paris Agreement on climate change, with the aim of providing a firm foundation for the market and fostering climate cooperation between countries.

EU Member States have adopted a climate target for 2040 that will allow high-quality international carbon credits to be used to contribute up to 5% towards the target, thereby helping to achieve European climate goals cost-efficiently by raising EU funding for projects outside the bloc. In addition, the European Commission has proposed to integrate permanent carbon removal projects, located on European soil, into the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

World Economic Outlook in Autumn 2025: Global Economy Hampered by an Adverse Trade Environment

2025-09-11T00:00:00+02:00

US trade measures have driven the global outlook downwards compared to spring forecasts: global GDP growth is expected to stand at 3.0% in 2025 and 2.9% in 2026, down from 3.3% in 2024.

Among advanced economies, growth is set to considerably slow in 2025 and 2026 in the United States, as consumption is adversely impacted by tariff hikes and budgetary cuts. Euro area growth should be driven by a pick-up in consumption following a decline in inflation and by sustained investment as a result of falling interest rates. However, growth is expected to be hindered by trade tensions and the appreciation of the euro. Germany’s growth is set to be sluggish in 2025, but should recover in 2026 with the help of fiscal stimulus, while weak growth is expected in Italy in spite of support in the form of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP). Spain’s growth is projected to remain far more robust, driven by population growth, dynamic investment and tourism. An expansionary fiscal policy is expected to support the United Kingdom’s growth.

Most major emerging economies are expected to experience a slowdown in growth in 2025 and 2026: in particular, China’s growth is set to falter as a result of trade measures and persistent structural imbalances.

Global trade should continue to be hampered by US trade measures, with growth of just 2.1% in 2025 and 2.3% in 2026, significantly below its historical average (2.8% from 2015 to 2019). Recovery in 2025, expected as a result of forecasts of tariff hikes for the first half of the year and demand from advanced economies, should be weaker than projected as it has been hindered by a decline in imports from China and India. In 2026, a pick-up in emerging-economy imports is not expected to offset declining US imports.

The risks surrounding this scenario are mostly skewed to the downside as the Trump administration continues to threaten to impose new tariffs amid persistent geopolitical tensions.

The Attention Economy in the Digital Age

2025-09-04T00:00:00+02:00

The attention economy refers to business models that seek to monetise consumer attention. Most of these business models rely on advertising, allowing them to provide certain services appreciated by consumers free of charge or at a special rate. Consumers then indirectly “pay” for these services by providing an audience for advertisers.

While these business models have been used for a number of years by legacy media (e.g. print, television), certain digital platforms such as social media are taking them even further, due to technical and economic characteristics specific to their industry.

Digital firms in the attention economy generate economic activity via their revenue, sales from online advertisements and productivity gains from the development of new tools and features.

Nevertheless, the business models of the attention economy have significant negative externalities for users and society (e.g. reduced productivity, impact on cognitive abilities and mental health). According to a review of the existing literature, these negative externalities could reduce GDP in the long term by 2 to 3 percentage points for the quantifiable portion of these impacts. This order of magnitude – which should be interpreted with caution owing to its underlying assumptions – depends above all on a decline in children’s cognitive abilities, which is expected to lower their future productivity when they enter the labour market as adults (see Chart on cover page).

Regulatory initiatives being taken at national and European Union level involve (i) regulating platform features, (ii) protecting vulnerable groups such as children, and (iii) fostering competition to aid the development of healthier alternatives.

World Economic Outlook in Spring 2025 Growth Amid Global Turbulence

2025-03-20T00:00:00+01:00

The international scenario, set on 21 February, assumes that the United States will double its existing tariffs on imports from the European Union, China, Canada and Mexico from the 2nd quarter of 2025 onwards. Equivalent countermeasures by these trading partners are also assumed to take effect at the same time. The ensuing turbulence is expected to reduce global GDP growth by 0.1 percentage points (pp) in 2025 and by 0.2 pp in 2026. Similarly, world trade is projected to shrink by 0.2 pp in 2025 and by 0.7 pp the following year.

In line with these assumptions, and provided uncertainties around US economic and trade policies resolve quickly, the global economy should still perform fairly robustly, though somewhat weaker than predicted in September 2024. Global GDP is projected to grow at a steady 3.2% in both 2025 and 2026, roughly in line with 2024, and only marginally below the average pace recorded during the 2010s.

Among advanced economies, economic prospects diverge. Growth is expected to remain solid in the United States – if financial stability persists and investment is not excessively dampened by trade policy uncertainties – and in Spain. Germany, however, faces sluggish prospects, weighed down by delays in the emergence of the recently unveiled investment plans’ effects (announced after the forecast cut-off date), while Italy and the United Kingdom are likely to fall in the middle. These differences reflect differing exposure to tariff hikes and varying growth momentum for 2025, established at the end of 2024. By 2026, these disparities are expected to narrow somewhat.

In the major emerging economies, namely China, India, Brazil and Turkey, economic activity is expected to slow down in 2025. China’s performance is expected to be particularly hampered by enduring structural imbalances. For 2026, the trajectory for emerging economies is expected to be closely tied to the course of monetary policy.

Paradoxically, despite tightening trade policies, global trade volumes are set to pick up speed in 2025 and 2026 after two years of subdued momentum. However, this recovery should be partial and notably weaker than anticipated in the previous September forecast (see Chart). Global trade is expected to continue to be driven by emerging economies, and as a result France should experience comparatively modest demand growth.
These forecasts come with substantial risks – primarily emanating from uncertain global trade policy developments: recent tariff announcements by the US administration amplify downside risk significantly with regard to the assumptions adopted.

Lessons from Past Industrial Policies

2025-02-13T00:00:00+01:00

Industrial policies aimed at the creation and development of specific sectors have made a comeback against a backdrop of a mounting number of crises, trade tensions, an accelerating innovation race and the imperative of combating climate change (see Chart on cover page). A study of policies in eight advanced and catching-up countries from 1945 to 2000 provides useful insight into the conditions determining their success or failure.

Industrial policy had similar aims in all countries studied: (i) growth and competitiveness; (ii) support for major transitions (energy, space, etc.); (iii) strategic autonomy and sovereignty; and (iv) support for declining sectors.

Although different models of industrial policy exist, most countries have intervened in a targeted manner in specific sectors. The catching-up countries (Japan followed by South Korea and China), France and the United Kingdom – up to the 1980s – directly intervened in the development of industrial production capacities. In the United States, sector measures were decentralised and limited to R&D support and government procurement in military and high value-added sectors.

The advanced countries’ sector-specific measures focused on emerging sectors with high stakes in defence- and sovereignty (aviation, energy and space in the post-war period followed, as in the catching-up countries, by electronics and IT). The catching-up countries initially focused on mature, but high-growth-potential mid-tech sectors (automobiles, chemicals and shipbuilding) and then on high-tech sectors (primarily electronics and IT).

International sector-specific industrial policy experiences provide useful insight for shaping today’s policies. For example, the success of both export aid conditional on performance in South Korea and the precise specification of ambitious technological goals in US development contracts suggests that setting high commercial and technological performance targets is a factor for success.

The Artificial Intelligence Value Chain: What Economic Stakes and Role for France?

2024-12-05T00:00:00+01:00

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to various techniques enabling machines to simulate human intelligence. The AI value chain is divided into three main segments (see Chart below): (i) the inputs required to develop AI systems and services (computing power, data, specialised workforce); (ii) modelling, which includes the development of general-purpose AI models (foundation models) and specialised models; and (iii) the deployment of such models to end-users.

Regarding AI system inputs, France has no major companies on par with the global leaders in the chip manufacturing and computing power rental markets. However, it benefits from a skilled workforce and a thriving innovation ecosystem.

As for AI model development, a few French companies are emerging, but the segment is dominated by the incumbent Big Tech firms established prior to the advent of AI technology. These incumbents enjoy vertical integration thanks to their preferential access to upstream inputs and downstream distribution channels for their AI solutions (e.g. office suite software). They have also partnered with emerging AI firms to integrate AI production processes horizontally.

The dominance of the AI market by a small number of large, already mature firms raises issues of economic efficiency, fair competition, and sovereignty, with the risk of limiting the economy-wide diffusion of AI-related added value and productivity gains.

The Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence

2024-04-02T00:00:00+02:00

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to a set of techniques which enables machines to simulate human intelligence. Its development is a technological revolution which, much like with previous revolutions of this kind, could generate profound economic changes. While research to quantify the impact of AI is still in the exploratory stage, such work provides some preliminary insights.

On a macroeconomic level, it is too early to empirically discern an impact on growth, but some initial microeconomic studies suggest that certain specific applications of AI have a significant positive impact on individual worker productivity. In a given job, these gains benefit the least productive workers the most, allowing them to catch up to their most productive peers. However, the impact of AI on business productivity has been found to be modest for the time being. This may be due to companies’ still limited and uneven adoption of AI, although there is more widespread adoption among large companies and digital firms.

The theoretical impact of AI on employment is uncertain. In the short term, this impact will depend on the speed at which AI is deployed, the shift of certain occupations towards AI-complementary tasks and the reallocation of labour towards occupations in growing demand. Furthermore, initial empirical estimates indicate that the tasks and occupations impacted by AI will not be the same as those affected by previous technological revolutions. Skilled occupations are expected to be more impacted by AI due to its ability to perform abstract, non-routine tasks, whereas the previous waves of automation and computerisation had impacted unskilled occupations and mid-level occupations, respectively.

These various findings point to the need to strengthen science curricula in primary and secondary education and AI curricula in higher education, to focus on continuing training for occupations affected by AI and to remove certain barriers to the diffusion of artificial intelligence, particularly by adapting competition policy to its particular qualities.

World Economic Outlook in Spring 2024 Moderate and Uneven Growth

2024-03-19T00:00:00+01:00

Global growth is projected at 3.1% in 2024, mirroring the pace set in 2023, with a slight uptick expected in 2025 to 3.2%. This outlook marks a modest improvement over previous forecasts from autumn 2023. Despite easing production constraints and a confirmed inflationary pullback, the global economy remains shackled by the lingering effects of monetary tightening and geopolitical uncertainties. The global economy’s growth trajectory, therefore, slightly lags behind the late 2010s average.

Growth in advanced economies is anticipated to remain subdued, with significant disparities among countries. In 2024, economic activity is expected to be robust in the United States and Spain but sluggish in other major advanced economies like the United Kingdom and Germany. By 2025, growth rates are anticipated to converge, driven by an acceleration in the euro area and a slowdown in the United States, assuming a gradual return of the savings rate to its historical average.

Major emerging economies like India, Turkey and Brazil should see a slowdown in 2024, followed by a rebound in 2025. China’s economy is projected to continue slowing, hampered by its failure to pivot its growth model towards domestic demand.

After a decline in 2023, global trade is expected to recover in 2024 and 2025. However, the global demand for French exports is predicted to be less robust than international trade. This reflects the more sluggish activity in the euro area, which is expected to rebound modestly in 2024, before accelerating in 2025 (see Chart on this page).

Geopolitical uncertainties, the timing and magnitude of key rate cuts, and shifts in consumer behaviour emerge as the primary risks surrounding this scenario.

World Economic Outlook in Autumn 2023: The Economy is Holding Out Against Rising Interest Rates

2023-09-12T00:00:00+02:00

Global growth is expected to slow to 3.0% in 2023, down from 3.5% in 2022. This is primarily due to the tightening of monetary policy to cut inflation. In 2024, the world economy should grow at the same pace (3.0%) which will still be below its pre-COVID average, as the continuing slowdown in advanced countries is being offset by more robust growth in certain emerging ones.

In advanced economies, economic activity held up better than projected during the first half of 2023. In Europe, the supply of energy this winter has been secured and the supply-chain problems facing businesses have eased. The slowdown in growth in 2023 and 2024 is chiefly the result of monetary tightening and its effect on investment. Each country’s growth path is also contingent on its residual catch-up capabilities following the COVID-19 pandemic, especially as regards consumption, which are greater in the euro area than in the United States, and on the extent of its exposure to world trade which is putting a drag on Germany in particular.

In emerging economies, growth is set to remain vibrant overall in 2023 but could show the first signs that it is running out of steam. As an example, China should experience a more limited recovery (+5.0%) than first forecast, due to the weak upturn in consumption and little support from the authorities against the backdrop of the real estate crisis. In 2024, it is estimated that most emerging economies will benefit from a reduction in inflationary pressure and the relaxing of monetary policies.

It is projected that world trade will slow significantly in 2023 in the wake of the severe contraction in trade during winter 2022-2023, before returning to normal levels in 2024. World demand for French exports (see Chart) should fall slightly in 2023 due to lower imports in advanced countries before bouncing back in 2024, driven by faster growth in the euro area.

The main risks to this scenario are changes to inflation and the effect of monetary policy on economic activity and on the financial sector.

What Factors Could Drive the Reorganisation of Global Value Chains?

2023-07-27T00:00:00+02:00

After an exceptional expansion in trade in the 1990s and 2000s, globalisation experienced a slowdown between the financial crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic, largely due to the rebalancing of China’s economic growth (see Chart).

The pandemic led to tensions, or even shortages, in certain value chains, revealing supply vulnerabilities in some countries. These disruptions raise the question of how resilient the global production organisation is and if globalisation is built to last. After the shock from the pandemic in 2020, the scale of global trade has exceeded its 2019 level, and the distance travelled by goods is as large as before.

However, the structure of trade has evolved. Exports of goods returned to their pre-pandemic level by December 2020, compared to September 2021 for services. The quick recovery in trade particularly benefitted China, which increased its trade surplus due to its exports.

Changes in the organisation of value chains in the years to come will depend on several factors. Geopolitical tensions and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have led to trade diversion, which could increase in the context of new sanctions and businesses seeking out more secure ways to conduct trade. Climate change could affect certain production lines, particularly due to a decrease in agricultural yields and the relocation of agricultural production. Governments could encourage or even require businesses to adjust their value chains to reinforce their resilience and sustainability, or respond with protectionist measures.

Owing to these different factors, some particularly concentrated value chains are showing initial signs of diversification. Manufacturers of semiconductors, which have mostly been based in Korea and Taiwan up to now, have announced large-scale investments in production capacity in Japan, the United States and Europe.

World Economic Outlook in Spring 2023: The Economy Reaches Its Trough

2023-03-21T00:00:00+01:00

The world economy is expected to grow by 2.8% in 2023, down markedly from 3.4% in 2022 due to the effects of high inflation and substantial key rate hikes by the major central banks, despite support from the reopening of China's economy. A slightly higher 3.0% is projected for 2024 as monetary policies ease.

Positive growth is forecast for advanced economies in 2023, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which is set to enter a recession brought on by 2022's strong inflation and persistent Brexit-related weaknesses in its economy. Over our forecast horizon (2023 and 2024), European economies should continue to be supported by the NextGenerationEU recovery plan, particularly Italy and Spain. In 2024, we expect the United States to benefit from a rebound in investment fuelled by a revival of industry policy.

In emerging economies, we anticipate strong economic growth overall, led by China and India, with slowdowns in Brazil and Turkey. China is set for a rebound in 2023, driven by a faster reopening of its economy than expected and a recovery in household spending. In Turkey, the aftermath of the 2023 earthquakes is likely to put a damper on growth.

World trade is expected to slow significantly in 2023 due to weaker economic activity before rebounding in 2024. Growth in world demand for French exports (see Chart on this page) should follow the same trend but lag behind global trade growth over the two-year period.

The main downside risks to this scenario include inflation developments, financial risks, the war in Ukraine and potential natural disasters.