Trésor-Info - Publications de la direction générale du Trésor - Japan

Lessons from Past Industrial Policies

2025-02-13T00:00:00+01:00

Industrial policies aimed at the creation and development of specific sectors have made a comeback against a backdrop of a mounting number of crises, trade tensions, an accelerating innovation race and the imperative of combating climate change (see Chart on cover page). A study of policies in eight advanced and catching-up countries from 1945 to 2000 provides useful insight into the conditions determining their success or failure.

Industrial policy had similar aims in all countries studied: (i) growth and competitiveness; (ii) support for major transitions (energy, space, etc.); (iii) strategic autonomy and sovereignty; and (iv) support for declining sectors.

Although different models of industrial policy exist, most countries have intervened in a targeted manner in specific sectors. The catching-up countries (Japan followed by South Korea and China), France and the United Kingdom – up to the 1980s – directly intervened in the development of industrial production capacities. In the United States, sector measures were decentralised and limited to R&D support and government procurement in military and high value-added sectors.

The advanced countries’ sector-specific measures focused on emerging sectors with high stakes in defence- and sovereignty (aviation, energy and space in the post-war period followed, as in the catching-up countries, by electronics and IT). The catching-up countries initially focused on mature, but high-growth-potential mid-tech sectors (automobiles, chemicals and shipbuilding) and then on high-tech sectors (primarily electronics and IT).

International sector-specific industrial policy experiences provide useful insight for shaping today’s policies. For example, the success of both export aid conditional on performance in South Korea and the precise specification of ambitious technological goals in US development contracts suggests that setting high commercial and technological performance targets is a factor for success.

Japanification: a Risk for China’s Economy?

2024-11-05T00:00:00+01:00

The “Japanification” of a country alludes to Japan’s economic situation starting from the early 1990s following decades of rapid growth. It is characterised by weak growth and inflation rates, and extremely low interest rates.

China currently bears many similarities to early-1990s Japan – its growth model is centred on industry and investment, and is reliant on buoyant exports. China is also laden with debt, and suffers from a population decline, a downward trend in growth (see Chart) and inflation, as well as a property sector crisis since 2021.

However, the extent of the decline in growth may be less considerable than in Japan given some of the Chinese economy’s strengths and its ability to learn from Japan’s difficulties. While China has reached the technological frontier in an increasing number of sectors, it is also looking to switch to a new growth model more focused on new technologies and on ramping up productivity.

The implementation of this new model could be hindered by China’s debt-laden local governments, and more generally there are lingering doubts over this model’s ability to sustain high levels of growth.

A similar fate to that suffered by Japan would mean a severe slowdown in the catch-up process, but not necessarily smaller productivity gains than in other countries: when adjusted for demographics, Japan’s growth had been indeed similar to that of other major advanced countries since 1990.

The Market for Safe Assets

2023-08-29T00:00:00+02:00

The holding of so-called “safe” assets, and the market for these securities more broadly, play a key role in maintaining financial stability. Yet there is no consensus as to how these assets are defined because the “safety” of a security depends on a number of different characteristics such as its stability, counter-cyclicality and liquidity, how transparently it is valued, and how solid its fundamentals are. The relative importance of these aspects varies according to investor preferences and financial-market conditions.

By examining how different asset classes perform against different safety criteria, it is possible to identify a universe of assets that can be considered “safe”, and to analyse developments in the market for these assets over the past two decades.

The supply of safe assets grew sharply in the 2010s, owing in part to sovereign bond issues. However, these assets became less readily available as central banks, especially in Europe, embarked on bond-buying programmes as part of a broader package of unconventional monetary policy measures. Despite increased supply, safe assets remained hard to come by throughout this period, as demand surged in both Europe and the United States, owing largely to the introduction of tighter prudential requirements in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

Globally, the market imbalance caused by these opposing forces has been partly redressed since the COVID-19 crisis of 2020, owing in large part to sovereign debt issues intended to fund pandemic support packages, which have had the effect of bringing the supply of safe assets into closer alignment with demand.

Looking ahead, the market could be affected by a number of major structural trends. Factors that could impact supply include the reshaping of the safe assets landscape amid the green transition, debt sustainability issues, rating downgrades and reform of the international monetary system. Meanwhile, demand could be influenced by developments such as the roll-back of unconventional monetary policy measures and changes to regulatory standards, especially those relating to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).

Japan's Growth Drivers

2023-04-27T00:00:00+02:00

After a dazzling economic catch-up in the post-war years, Japan has been experiencing low growth levels since the noughties – which distinguish it within the OECD – despite the efforts of successive governments to generate fresh momentum. Although it posted the highest GDP per capita growth in the G7 until the end of the 1990s, Japan, together with Italy, is the country in which growth has fallen the most on average since then (see Chart).

Initially buttressed by a rapid rise in capital stock, Japan’s growth has only been sustained by the workforce and total factor productivity since 2010, and this leverage is now weakening. The population is ageing and declining, and hourly labour productivity is growing meekly, especially in SMEs which are predominant in the manufacturing base and are less productive than large enterprises. Too much investment is earmarked to offset capital depreciation – a sign that this factor is poorly allocated. Potential growth, which stood at around 4.0% in 1990, is now estimated at less than 0.5%.

“Abenomics”, which were unveiled in 2013, aimed to expand the workforce and improve working conditions but they were only partly successful. Subsequent governments have focused on investments for the future to boost supply and lastingly lift productivity, through the digital transformation and the low-carbon transition initiated as from 2020, followed by the plan promoting a “new capitalism” which was introduced in 2021 and puts priority on entrepreneurship and vocational training.

Japanese growth will continue to be hampered by demographic trends and this calls for continued support for the employment of older workers, immigration and the birth rate by means of bold structural reforms. Japan also has headroom for improving the allocation of capital and the rollout of new technologies, a sector with strong growth potential.