Trésor-Info - Publications de la direction générale du Trésor - Employment

The Outcomes and Objectives of Apprenticeships in France

2025-11-25T00:00:00+01:00

In France, apprenticeships in secondary and higher education settings combine on-the-job training with formal learning at an apprentice training centre. At the end of the training period, apprentices obtain an occupational qualification, such as a diploma, degree or other occupational certification. Apprenticeships are meant to foster the employability of young graduates.

Since the 2018 reform of the system, apprenticeships have grown sharply in popularity among students pursuing their education. 879,000 new apprenticeship contracts were signed in 2024, compared to 306,000 in 2017, bringing the number of apprentices with an ongoing contract to one million at the end of 2024. This expansion was facilitated by the deregulation of the programmes offered by apprentice training centres. It was also bolstered by more flexible rules for contracts and the introduction of a government single subsidy scheme for employers of apprentices.

The sharp increase in apprenticeships has come with an almost tripled cost for the public purse. In 2023, the cost to public finances reached around €15bn, or €14,700 per apprentice. This level of government support is considerably higher than that of other European countries where apprenticeships are deeply rooted, such as Germany. Adjustments to apprenticeship support schemes in 2025 will help to curb their cost.

The rise in apprenticeships has occurred alongside major changes in the profiles of apprentices, who are now more likely to be students in higher education than in secondary school, and of employers, with a shift towards the service sector.

Apprenticeships are associated with an overall smoother transition from school to work for young people compared to academic-track students not doing an apprenticeship. For young people having obtained an occupational certification (certificat d’aptitude professionnelle – CAP) in 2021, 63% of apprentices were employed 18 months after their apprenticeship, compared to just 36% of academic-track students. This impact is less marked, however, as a person’s education level rises, and appears to be minimal at the master’s level.

Understanding Pathways Following Exhaustion of Unemployment Benefits

2025-10-30T00:00:00+01:00

On average from mid-2021 to mid-2024, approximately 57,000 people per month exhausted their unemployment benefits, accounting for 23% of unemployment benefit outflows.

This study focuses on job seekers who reached the end of their entitlement to unemployment benefits in the second half of 2022 and analyses their pathways over the following year based on detailed administrative data (Midas data) correlating waged employment, income support and registration with the national employment agency (France Travail).

The return to long-term employment is often gradual. 31% of former unemployment benefit recipients who exhausted their entitlement were in waged employment three months after exhausting their benefits. A full 58% of these individuals had worked again at least once as an employee after a year. Many individuals experience multiple employment contracts before finding long-term employment. A majority remain registered with France Travail while employed, reflecting active albeit fragmented return-to-work pathways. Minimum income benefits act as a safety net during these transitional periods.

18% of exhaustees receive the Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA) three months later and 11% receive the Allocation Spécifique de Solidarité (ASS).

Five typical pathways of equal weight are found over the year following unemployment benefits exhaustion (see chart).

The Social and Solidarity Economy: a Solution to Democratic, Social and Environmental Challenges?

2025-10-23T00:00:00+02:00

In 2019, the social and solidarity economy (SSE) employed almost 2.6 million wage earners (13.6% of private sector paid employment) in nearly 150,000 legal employment units and worked with 22 million volunteers. INSEE, France’s national institute of statistics and economic studies, estimates that the sector generated approximately 5% of national value added in 2012. Two-thirds of SSE staff are concentrated in three sectors (social action, education and finance-insurance).

Five categories of economic players (associations, cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and social enterprises) share three principles: the primacy of social utility, democratic governance and a non-profit nature. Act 2014-856 of 31 July 2014 raised the sector’s profile, facilitated statistical monitoring and consolidated the sector’s representative structures.

SSE entities suffer from financial vulnerabilities. They have a good risk profile and a low three-year default rate. Nevertheless, their median margins are no more than 14.6% (compared with 24.6% in the ‘conventional’ sector) and their equity remains low, which increases their structural exposure to public budget constraints.

SSE funding obstacles are caused by a lack of understanding of its models, significant information asymmetries and the fragmentation of fledgling impact finance. Solutions are emerging: €18 billion in solidarity savings fund deposits (+27% per year), €9-billion channelled into the SSE from regulated tax-free savings accounts (Livret A and LDDS), government-backed guarantees and impact contracts.

The SSE represents as much as 25% of employment in certain rural départements (Lozère and Deux-Sèvres) and provides key services such as home care, integration and culture.

The SSE plays a key role in environmental and democratic challenges. It is a circular economy pioneer, with two-thirds of reuse sector jobs, and helps spread new governance practices.

World Economic Outlook in Autumn 2024: Monetary Easing and Geopolitical Tensions

2024-09-19T00:00:00+02:00

Global growth is expected to reach 3.2% in 2024, a similar rate to 2023, before increasing to 3.4% in 2025. This outlook is a slight improvement on forecasts released in spring 2024. In 2025, global activity is anticipated to grow at the same pace as in the second half of the 2010s, supported by monetary policy easing and strong performances in emerging countries.

Growth is forecast to remain uneven across advanced economies. In 2024, activity is expected to be particularly robust in the United States and Spain, more moderate in Italy and the United Kingdom and flat in Germany. These advanced economies are experiencing different levels of growth due to disparities in consumption patterns and export performance. Growth rates are expected to converge in 2025, with an acceleration of activity in the euro area and a slight slowdown in the United States, primarily due to a weakening of household consumption.

Although still strong, activity in the major emerging economies – China, India, Brazil and Turkey – is projected to slow compared with 2023, particularly in China where structural imbalances are likely to continue to weigh on activity.

Following a contraction in 2023, global trade is anticipated to recover in 2024 and accelerate in 2025. Global trade is expected to be driven primarily by emerging economies and the United States, resulting in slower growth in global demand for French exports (see Chart).

Global activity could nonetheless be impacted by an escalation of geopolitical tensions, which are the main risks surrounding this scenario.

The Impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom's Economy

2024-04-30T00:00:00+02:00

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU), which was voted for by referendum in June 2016, became effective on 31 January 2020. After a transition period, the UK left the single market on 1 January 2021. Brexit has had an impact on the United Kingdom’s economy and has dampened its growth potential through three main channels.

Firstly, owing to the reintroduction of non-tariff barriers, the UK’s trade in goods with the EU fell in 2021 to a greater extent than trade with non-EU countries, although the impact only seems to have been temporary. On the other hand, trade in services with the EU has been more lastingly affected, especially for financial and transportation services.

Secondly, business investment in most sectors has stalled since the 2016 referendum following a period of strong growth. Due to the effects of both Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic, in Q2 2023, it was more than 20% below the level that it would have reached had it maintained the momentum seen between Q1 2010 and Q2 2016 (see Chart).

Lastly, restrictions on the employment of EU nationals have reduced the labour supply at a time when the UK’s labour market is under great strain. Employment of EU workers has levelled off since 2016 whereas it had rocketed during the years prior to the referendum. This has forced British employers to have greater recourse to non-European labour.

The Economic Implications of Artificial Intelligence

2024-04-02T00:00:00+02:00

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to a set of techniques which enables machines to simulate human intelligence. Its development is a technological revolution which, much like with previous revolutions of this kind, could generate profound economic changes. While research to quantify the impact of AI is still in the exploratory stage, such work provides some preliminary insights.

On a macroeconomic level, it is too early to empirically discern an impact on growth, but some initial microeconomic studies suggest that certain specific applications of AI have a significant positive impact on individual worker productivity. In a given job, these gains benefit the least productive workers the most, allowing them to catch up to their most productive peers. However, the impact of AI on business productivity has been found to be modest for the time being. This may be due to companies’ still limited and uneven adoption of AI, although there is more widespread adoption among large companies and digital firms.

The theoretical impact of AI on employment is uncertain. In the short term, this impact will depend on the speed at which AI is deployed, the shift of certain occupations towards AI-complementary tasks and the reallocation of labour towards occupations in growing demand. Furthermore, initial empirical estimates indicate that the tasks and occupations impacted by AI will not be the same as those affected by previous technological revolutions. Skilled occupations are expected to be more impacted by AI due to its ability to perform abstract, non-routine tasks, whereas the previous waves of automation and computerisation had impacted unskilled occupations and mid-level occupations, respectively.

These various findings point to the need to strengthen science curricula in primary and secondary education and AI curricula in higher education, to focus on continuing training for occupations affected by AI and to remove certain barriers to the diffusion of artificial intelligence, particularly by adapting competition policy to its particular qualities.

The Dual Income Tax System in Sweden

2023-09-21T00:00:00+02:00

For quite some time Sweden has stood out for its high level of aggregate tax and social security contributions, but over the past twenty years the tax burden has significantly lightened. Households are the hardest hit by the Swedish taxation system. Most general government revenue is generated by indirect taxation and personal income tax, with the latter financing local authorities to a large degree and its marginal rate exceeding 50% in the higher brackets. Tax on personal assets is low.

Most notably, Sweden was the first country to introduce a dual income tax system, with the progressive taxation of labour income and the flat-rate tax for capital income, as part of a major reform in 1991. With a view to bolstering competitiveness, there has also been a constant effort to cut rates and broaden the tax base. The corporation tax rate has been gradually lowered to 20.6%, matching the EU average.

The moderate level of social security contributions is partly attributable to the pension system’s strong reliance on capitalisation. Generally speaking, taxation of the labour factor nevertheless remains relatively high as a result of the general payroll tax.

The 1991 reform resulted in a foreign direct investment boom and a pick-up in the pace of total factor productivity growth. Over the long term, Sweden has one of the highest business investment rates in the EU, but taxation of the labour factor is accompanied by structurally high unemployment.

Unequal Access to Day Nurseries and Related Economic Issues

2023-01-26T00:00:00+01:00

Government policies for childcare for the under-threes are two-pronged: to support parents’ professional activity and to foster children’s development until they start nursery school (école maternelle). They encompass all postnatal leave arrangements, financial support to cover the cost of formal childcare with a child minder or in a day nursery (crèche), and the provision of a day nursery service.

In the first few months of a child’s life, care by the parents is the most beneficial, all the more so when it is provided by both parents. However, after the first year, formal childcare, particularly in a collective childcare, is preferable for the child, especially if they are from a disadvantaged background. In the long term, funding childcare places for young children enables them to develop their abilities and human capital in general, and helps reduce social inequalities.

The unequal day nursery offering throughout France sometimes hinders access to formal childcare and limits the parents’ ability to work, in particular in single-parent households. In addition, the net cost of formal childcare restricts its use by low-income households. Childcare by parents is mostly provided by mothers and it distances them from the labour market when it lasts too long. As a result, it exacerbates social and gender inequality.

Improved governance by defining a leader from among the many stakeholders is required in order to expand the day nursery childcare offering. In addition, bringing the net cost for childcare by a child minder, which is incidentally less costly for the public purse, more into line with that for childcare in a day nursery, as provided for by the 2023 Social Security Budget Act, would spur recourse to formal childcare by low-income households.