



Séminaire Fourgeaud - Direction générale du Trésor

Paris, 11/01/2017

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European Commission

Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs

Unit A.2: EMU deepening and macroeconomy of the euro area



Cross-border risk sharing after asymmetric shocks: evidence from the euro area and the United States

*Published in Quarterly Report on the Euro Area
Vol. 15, No. 2 (2016)*

*Financial Union: Resilience in the Eurozone,
VoxEU Column, 25 August 2016
(with Marco Buti and José Leandro)*

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this presentation are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official views of the European Commission.

Motivation

- More than 20 years into the EMU existence and several years since the crisis, there is an increased exposure to asymmetric shocks
- It is essential to strengthen the resilience of the euro area to large asymmetric shocks.
- Enhancing the cohesion of the monetary union will help it function in a better way.
- Proper cross-border risk sharing in the euro area reduces the risk in each country by spreading it among a large group.
- This supports consumption after asymmetric shocks to output and stops disparities from becoming entrenched.

Channels of risk sharing

- In this paper risk sharing is the ability to smooth consumption after an asymmetric output shock
- Private channels
 - Capital income from abroad – i.e. owning shares in a different stock market that is not affected, ex-ante insurance.
 - Borrowing from abroad, so called credit market channel, ex-post insurance.
 - Cross-border labour income, commuter workers, remittances.
- Public channels
 - Cross-border fiscal support – subsidies, social protection, cross-border public investment, cross-border fiscal capacity.
- Conditions for smooth operation of cross-border risk sharing
 - Private channels – single market of financial services, Capital Markets Union, Banking Union, labour mobility.
 - Public channels – re-insurance mechanisms, solidarity among members, higher degree of political and institutional integration.

Related literature

- Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996)
 - Private and public risk sharing channels among the 50 US States.
 - Methodology – a series of panel regressions of aggregate output, income and consumption. Same approach here.
 - GLS smoothing estimates (1964-1990)
 - Capital markets (cross-border factor income) (39%); Federal government (13%); Credit markets (23%), not smoothed (25%)
- Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013)
 - Apply the ASY (1996) methodology to 15 euro area (1979-2010).
 - Use dummies for economic downturns – normal vs. severe; permanent vs. transitory; anticipated vs. unanticipated; symmetric vs. asymmetric.
 - Risk sharing is especially low when it is most needed, i.e. in downturns that are severe and unanticipated.
- Hepp and von Hagen (2013)
 - Compares risk sharing channels within a federal entity (DE).
 - Results show that there is a significant home bias in risk sharing – channels operate better than within the euro area
 - Institutional setup of the links between Member States must be important

Related literature - results



Table 3. Channels of output smoothing across countries

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)
	Euro area 1979-2010	EU 1979-2010	OECD 1979-2010	US ^a 1963-1990	Germany ^b 1970-1994	Germany ^b 1995-2006
Factor income flows ^c	0.076** (2.21)	0.062** (2.16)	0.006 (0.22)	0.390*** (13.00)	0.195** (2.87)	0.505*** (6.82)
Capital depreciation	-0.084*** (-6.13)	-0.110*** (-8.73)	-0.097*** (-6.34)			
Net taxes and transfers ^d	0.039*** (3.35)	0.035*** (3.56)	0.026*** (5.22)	0.130*** (13.00)	0.541*** (5.15)	0.114 (1.58)
Saving	0.310*** (5.40)	0.322*** (6.36)	0.329*** (6.13)	0.230*** (3.83)	0.173** (2.14)	0.175*** (3.13)
Public	0.092*** (4.25)	0.108*** (6.16)	0.085*** (5.59)			
Private	0.218*** (4.48)	0.214*** (5.09)	0.244*** (5.55)			
Unsmoothed	0.658*** (12.18)	0.691*** (15.36)	0.736*** (17.23)	0.250*** (4.17)	0.085** (2.02)	0.208*** (3.014)



***, **, *denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. ^a refers to estimates reported in Table 1 of Asdrubali et al. (1996) obtained with two-step GLS; ^b refers to estimates reported in Table 5 (column I) of Hepp and von Hagen (2013); ^c international income flows for EU, OECD and euro area, while domestic income flows for the U.S. and Germany; ^d international net taxes and transfers for EU, OECD and euro area, while federal government taxes and transfers for the U.S. and Germany.

Source: Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013), note that in IV, V and VI capital depreciation is not reported separately.

Convergence in the euro area




Dispersion of output and consumption growth



Cross-state dispersion of output and consumption growth in the euro area and the 50 US states (1)
in pps., 1999-2015

Standard deviation of growth in real per-capita terms


Channels of risk sharing



Cross-border employment, EA19(1)

Employment by citizenship other than of the reporting country, 15-64 year old, % of total employment

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey



Cross-border financial instruments in the euro area

2001 = 100

For loans and deposits other bank counterparties are excluded

Source: BIS, IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey

Methodology

We want to see how an asymmetric shock in output in the euro area is smoothed so it affects consumption as little as possible.

$$\text{Starting from } GDP = \frac{GDP}{GNI} \cdot \frac{GNI}{GDI} \cdot \frac{GDI}{C} \cdot C$$

$$\Delta \log GDP_t^i - \Delta \log GNI_t^i = \mu_{fi,t} + \beta_{fi} \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{fi,t}^i$$

$$\Delta \log GNI_t^i - \Delta \log GDI_t^i = \mu_{tr,t} + \beta_{tr} \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{tr,t}^i$$

$$\Delta \log GDI_t^i - \Delta \log C_t^i = \mu_{s,t} + \beta_s \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{s,t}^i$$

$$\Delta \log C_t^i = \mu_{u,t} + \beta_u \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{u,t}^i$$

we can show that $1 = \beta_{fi} + \beta_{tr} + \beta_s + \beta_u$ as these are the relative weights of the different consumption smoothing channels plus the unsmoothed part.

This is in fact a sequential move down balancing items in the NA, where differences are:


- **Net factor income from abroad, including labour income. Part of it is called "capital market channel"**
- **Cross-border fiscal transfers**
- **Savings/borrowings or "credit market channel"**

Data construction

- Variables needed – output (GDP), income (GNI), disposable income (GDI) and consumption (C)
- For the euro area these are available in quarterly frequency at the national level, instructional sector total economy
 - Difference between GDP and GNI is net factor income from abroad
 - Difference between GNI and GDI is net fiscal transfers from abroad
 - Difference between GDI and C is saving/borrowing from abroad
- For the US, data on output and consumption at the state level are available
- US data on income and disposable income are constructed
 - Same approach as in the Appendix of ASY (1996)
 - Itemisation of federal transfers and taxes to ensure federal-state flows
 - US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), US Census Bureau

Main findings

Cross-border risk sharing through different channels
in % of total asymmetric shock to output











- Unsmoothed part in EA much bigger than in the US
- Cross-border savings/borrowing channels similar.
- Cross-border fiscal channel in the euro area virtually non-existing.
- Cross-border capital channel much smaller because financial union incomplete.

Econometric results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk sharing through:	2-step GLS	2-step GLS	2-step GLS	PC-OLS
cross-border factor income	0.0504*** (7.22)	0.0229*** (3.16)	0.0367*** (5.68)	0.4440*** (15.09)
of which cross-border labour compensation	0.0024*** (2.81)	-0.0015*** (-4.14)	-0.0012*** (-2.82)	
cross-border fiscal transfers	-0.0007 (-0.39)	0.0156*** (8.47)	0.0257*** (7.61)	0.0853*** (10.15)
credit markets	0.1816*** (17.38)	0.2459*** (8.31)	0.1800*** (4.78)	0.2566*** (5.92)
unsmoothed	0.7574*** (378.4)	0.6171*** (25.05)	0.6312*** (18.38)	0.1947*** (6.15)
Countries	Full panel - 13 countries: BE, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LV, NL, PT, SK, SL	Old member states - 9 countries: BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT	Core vs. periphery - 5 countries: DE, ES, IE, NL, PT	50 US states
Period	2000Q4-2015Q4	2000Q4-2015Q4	2000Q4-2015Q4	1964-2014
No of observations	793	549	305	2550

*Estimation through 2-step GLS, correcting for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (EA); ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors (US). Both estimations include an AR1 autocorrelation structure of errors, common among panels. Variables in first difference of natural logarithms. Time Fixed Effects (FE) not reported. *** denotes significance at 1% level.*

Rolling regression coefficients - US



20-year windows

30-year windows

- Risk sharing through fiscal transfers is pretty stable.
- Trade-off in the role of capital and credit markets, overall level of risk sharing doesn't change.


Dummy variables – Euro Area

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \log GDP_t^i - \Delta \log GNI_t^i &= \mu_{fi,t} + \beta_{fi} \cdot (1 - D_t^i) \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + \gamma_{fi} \cdot D_t^i \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{fi,t}^i \\ \Delta \log GNI_t^i - \Delta \log GDI_t^i &= \mu_{tr,t} + \beta_{tr} \cdot (1 - D_t^i) \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + \gamma_{tr} \cdot D_t^i \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{tr,t}^i \\ \Delta \log GDI_t^i - \Delta \log C_t^i &= \mu_{s,t} + \beta_s \cdot (1 - D_t^i) \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + \gamma_s \cdot D_t^i \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{s,t}^i \\ \Delta \log C_t^i &= \mu_{u,t} + \beta_u \cdot (1 - D_t^i) \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + \gamma_u \cdot D_t^i \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t^i + u_{u,t}^i\end{aligned}$$

- Dummy variable, D_t^i takes the value of 1 after 2008/Q4 and zero before. Thus beta are the before-the-crisis coefficients and gamma are after-the-crisis coefficients.
- The model is run for EA13 - BE, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LV, NL, PT, SK, SL (2000Q4-2015Q4)

Estimation through 2-step GLS, correcting for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (EA); include an AR1 autocorrelation structure of errors, common among panels. Variables in first difference of natural logarithms. Time FE not reported.

Euro Area, pre- and after-crisis



- Shift from risk sharing through credit markets (savings/borrowings channel) to risk sharing through capital markets (net factor income channel). Opposite was seen in the US.
- The optimal weights of the different channels are difficult to determine.
- The unsmoothed part remains constant in the euro area as well.

Conclusion

- Enhancing private risk sharing is a priority.
- This can be done through the completion of the Banking Union.
 - Common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund – separate banks from sovereigns.
 - Common deposit insurance scheme.
- Building a Capital Markets Union that will reduce bank dependence on firm financing and increase ex-ante risk sharing.
- Structural reforms will enhance the performance of labour markets and facilitate risk sharing through cross-border labour income.
- Cross-border fiscal risk sharing is important in a fully-fledged economic union like the US, but less than the private channels.

Future work

- Better account of the role of cross-border labour income
- The role of remittances
- The role of structural funds
- Role of public and private savings channel
- Dynamic risk sharing
- Integration in a DSGE model



Thank you for your attention

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