

5th No Money for Terror ministerial conference statement

1. We, members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Global Network, among which members of the Global Coalition against Daesh, participated to the 5th No Money for Terror ministerial meeting in Paris on May 19 2026, in the presence of international and regional organizations and agencies, to strengthen our action and coordination in fighting terrorism financing.
2. Terrorism continues to be a global scourge that inflicts senseless violence on innocent victims, undermines international security, and fuels fear, instability, and division across societies. Despite ongoing counter-terrorism efforts, terrorist organizations and individuals continue to carry out attacks and inspire violence in multiple regions, demonstrating that the threats have evolved and remain persistent. It is paramount that now, more than ever, the global community comes together to ensure that there are no safe havens for the financing or resourcing of such deadly violence, uncompromising with any form of State-sponsored terrorism financing, which contravenes international norms and undermines the credibility of our shared commitment to combat terrorist financing on a global level.
3. In line with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), we reaffirm our commitment to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to refrain from providing support to those involved in them, in accordance with United Nations Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 2462 (2019). We note that the TF Convention explicitly states that “criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”.
4. To do so, we reiterate our commitment to carry on the implementation of the Paris Agenda adopted on April 26 2018 at the occasion of the first No Money for Terror ministerial conference. Building on follow-up conferences in Melbourne (2019), New Delhi (2022) and Munich (2025), we took stock of progress made.
5. We reaffirm that an integrated approach to preventing and countering terrorism and terrorism financing is crucial and call on members to continue taking disruptive actions against financial facilitators that enable terrorist activities and operations while ensuring that the unintended consequences of CFT measures do not unnecessarily disrupt, delay or discourage legitimate economic activity. Taking into account the latest trends and evolutions of terrorism financing risks, we remain determined to strengthen our efforts in the fight against the financing of terrorist individuals, groups, acts and entities, especially in the field of three priority actions:

I - Preventing the misuse of financial innovations for terrorist financing

6. Terrorists use a variety of methods to raise, move, and use funds around the world. While many terrorist groups continue to rely on traditional methods of moving funds, in recent years many groups have become more inclined to adopt virtual assets and other digital payment methods. While new technologies play a crucial role in global innovation and economic development, we share concerns over the misuse of digital innovation and technologies for terrorist financing purposes, and reiterated our commitment to explore the role of technology in combatting illicit financial flows. We took stock that conducting investigations on the financing of terrorism via virtual assets is becoming increasingly challenging. We observe the interlinkages between digital technologies and traditional financing channels, which create new financing risks. We also recognize the important role of online crowdfunding platforms, social media, instant messaging applications, and other digital platforms which can be exploited as accelerators for illicit financing.
7. We acknowledge that, as virtual assets already occupy a prominent place in our economies and as their importance will continue growing, it is our role to accompany their deployment with a robust, effective and risk-based AML/CFT/CPF regulation, tailored to the industry and products, as was done with previous financial innovations, such as online payment service providers or online banking services. We also recognize that illicit actors take advantage of jurisdictional differences in approaches implemented to regulate virtual assets and virtual assets service providers (VASPs).
8. In this context, we urge on FATF to strengthen member jurisdictions' enforcement of FATF standards on virtual assets and VASPs as a priority. We call on FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) to focus on compliance with these standards throughout the mutual evaluation processes and follow-up reports. FATF and FSRBs should also consider taking further actions for the timely remediation of deficiencies in regulation, supervision and enforcement of FATF standards related to virtual assets and VASPs, including through follow-up procedures, guidance, capacity-building and other relevant actions. We further call on the FATF to follow-up on its risk-assessment work related to stablecoins and unhosted wallets, in order to make these financial instruments more resilient to terrorism financing, and to further examine other high priority risk areas such as abuse of pre-paid vouchers and Over The Counter (OTC) desks. We also underline the importance of strengthened public-private information sharing and closer international cooperation to ensure rapid detection and disruption of terrorist financing, including where there is a link to digital technologies.

9. We also encourage further coordination among supervisors to ensure a harmonised implementation of standards, in particular regarding the Travel Rule, and among law enforcement authorities and financial intelligence units to guarantee a swift operational response. We emphasize that preventing the emergence of regulatory havens is vital in this domain and, to that end, we commit to promoting access to crypto-related data for investigation purposes in all jurisdictions with the same degree of efficiency as to other financial data.
10. Significant resources and expertise must be mobilised by competent authorities on AML/CFT/CPF in every jurisdiction, in order to keep track of the rapid growth and evolution of the virtual asset sector and to ensure the industry can thrive in a safe and secure manner.
11. We call on all actors of the virtual assets ecosystem, including but not limited to VASPs, to ensure appropriate cooperation with competent authorities, especially when receiving request for information in support of ongoing investigations.

II - Terrorist groups and territorial control: countering financing strategies moving towards financial reinclusion

12. Major financing risks stem from terrorist organisations holding any degree of territorial control, which allows them to exploit resources and institutions to support their operations. Funding streams derived from territorial control may include, but are not limited to, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, looting, natural resource exploitation, taxation-like mechanisms, customs and border fees, and State capture of public funds.
13. In line with UNSCR 2133, we underscore that ransom payments to terrorist groups are one of the sources of income which supports their recruitment efforts, strengthens their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks, and incentivizes future incidents of kidnapping for ransom. UNSCR 2133 also expresses the need to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law, and calls upon member states to prevent terrorist from benefitting directly or indirectly from ransom payments.
14. We reaffirm the need to support legitimate institutions against exploitation for terrorist purposes, especially those institutions responsible for State governance, financial sector oversight and AML/CFT/CPF capabilities in lower-capacity countries, through all available channels. This includes bilateral and multilateral assistance and collaboration.
15. We will enhance efforts to identify and disrupt transnational nodes, facilitators and networks that enable terrorist financing linked to territorial control, including through timely information sharing and targeted capacity building.

16. We also commit to supporting the effective implementation of AML/CFT/CPF measures that are risk-based and proportionate, as it contributes to economic development, financial inclusion and to mitigating unintended consequences, in line with FATF standards. In this regard, we reaffirm the United Nations humanitarian exemption set out in Resolution 2664 (2022) and welcome work undertaken by FATF to update its standards in line with this United Nations obligations.
17. We recognize that inclusive access to regulated financial services is an important contributor to social stability and development. Combined with sound institutional oversight, financial inclusion contributes to preventing terrorism financing, therefore we encourage the safe return of regulated financial services on a risk basis to areas that have experienced terrorist control. Mindful of remaining risks, financial reinclusion must be pursued in a manner that is supported by efforts to build strong compliance programmes and must incentivize the use of formal channels where available, while disincentivizing the use of unregulated financial channels.

III - Addressing the nexus between terrorism financing and organised crime

18. Terrorism financing strategies, in some areas, may draw from the means used and/or the proceeds gained by transnational organized crime activities, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, fraud, crime as a service, money laundering and other forms of organised crime. Incidentally, certain transnational organized crime groups were designated as terrorist entities in some jurisdictions, where the tactics and activities of those groups meet domestic legal thresholds for terrorist activities. We call on countries to closely monitor any potential interactions between terrorism and transnational organized crime, and to take steps to deter, detect and disrupt these interactions.
19. To further deprive terrorist groups of opportunities to leverage organized crime groups' illicit proceeds to fund their operations, we encourage members to leverage all tools at their disposal to identify and counter this source of funding, in accordance with national and international law. We also commit to enhancing international cooperation, including both formal and informal channels of cooperation, and to strengthening public-private information sharing. This requires deepening the exchange of information internationally, by responding to requests for information from partners in a timely and appropriate manner, and by proactively disseminating all relevant information to our partners.

Way forward

20. After closing a first cycle of *No Money for Terror* ministerial conferences, we commit to maintaining our common mobilisation against terrorism financing and to renew our meetings.
21. We thank the leadership of FATF and its Global Network of nine FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in countering terrorism financing, with the support of other competent international and regional institutions and agencies. We entrust FATF and its Global Network to continue leading technical works to improve our collective action against terrorism financing, and ensuring a follow-up process to our meetings.
22. We decide to meet in the near future to assess progress.