The Effects of Government Spending in the Eurozone

Ricardo Duque Gabriel (University of Bonn)

Mathias Klein (Sveriges Riksbank)

Ana Sofia Pessoa (University of Bonn)

Franco-German Seminar

10 Nov 2021

The opinions expressed in this presentation are the sole responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of Sveriges Riksbank.

・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・
 ・

Motivation

"(...) now it's high time I think for the fiscal policy to take charge" (Draghi, 2019)

- Fiscal policy in the Eurozone (back) at center stage:
 - Constrained monetary policy
 - Growing importance of EU regional structural funds
 - Corona rescue package

Motivation

"(...) now it's high time I think for the fiscal policy to take charge" (Draghi, 2019)

- Fiscal policy in the Eurozone (back) at center stage:
 - Constrained monetary policy
 - Growing importance of EU regional structural funds
 - Corona rescue package
- Confounding factors challenge identification at the aggregate level.
 → regional variation (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014)

In a nutshell

• RQ: What is the impact of regional fiscal policy on the output and employment in the Eurozone?

< □ > < /□ >

In a nutshell

- RQ: What is the impact of regional fiscal policy on the output and employment in the Eurozone?
- Regional effects of government spending shocks in the Eurozone:
 - Common monetary policy
 - Sectoral differences
 - Fiscal spillovers in the European single market
 - State-dependencies can be estimated more efficiently

312 9QA

ヨトィヨト

In a nutshell

- RQ: What is the impact of regional fiscal policy on the output and employment in the Eurozone?
- Regional effects of government spending shocks in the Eurozone:
 - Common monetary policy
 - Sectoral differences
 - Fiscal spillovers in the European single market
 - State-dependencies can be estimated more efficiently
- Methodology: Local Projections to estimate IRFs and fiscal multipliers

Results Preview

• Government spending output (employment) relative multiplier of 2.2 (1.4)

A B < A B </p>

Image: A matrix

ELE DOG

Results Preview

• Government spending output (employment) relative multiplier of 2.2 (1.4)

• Transmission:

- Crowding-in of priv. demand: investment, consumption durables (\uparrow)
- Positive supply side effects: investment, labor prod., TFP (\uparrow)
- Wages increase, labor share (markup) rises (falls)
- Strong employment effects (hours \uparrow , employment \uparrow , hours/worker \leftrightarrow)

Results Preview

• Government spending output (employment) relative multiplier of 2.2 (1.4)

• Transmission:

- Crowding-in of priv. demand: investment, consumption durables ([†])
- Positive supply side effects: investment, labor prod., TFP (↑)
- Wages increase, labor share (markup) rises (falls)
- Strong employment effects (hours \uparrow , employment \uparrow , hours/worker \leftrightarrow)

Sectoral differences

Small fiscal spillovers

000 EIE 4E + 4E

Literature Review

- Regional output multipliers for the U.S.: Nakamura and Steinsson 2014; Chodorow-Reich 2019; Bernardini et al. 2020 - range between (1 to 2.5)
- Regional Multipliers for Europe: European structural funds transfers
 - Coelho (2019): (1.8 to 4.1) for output
 - Canova, Pappa (2021): (-0.7 to 8.0) GVA; (-0.3 to 2.4) employment
- Here: impact of regional discretionary fiscal spending in Eurozone

Data

- Regional data at NUTS 2 level from ARDECO.
 → FRA has 27 regions (example: Île de France)
 → output, gross value added, investment, hours worked, employment, wages
- EMU sample: 1999-2017, 166 regions (first 12 Euro adopters).
- Gross value added (GVA) of non-market sector as proxy for final consumption expenditure of general government (GG)

ELE NOR

b 4 T b

Data

- Regional data at NUTS 2 level from ARDECO.
 → FRA has 27 regions (example: Île de France)
 → output, gross value added, investment, hours worked, employment, wages
- EMU sample: 1999-2017, 166 regions (first 12 Euro adopters).
- Gross value added (GVA) of non-market sector as proxy for final consumption expenditure of general government (GG)
 - They differ in two dimensions: (i) agents and (ii) composition.
 - Lion share of non-market GVA is generated by the GG.

Instrumental Variable Local Projections

Local projections to estimate fiscal multipliers:

$$\sum_{m=0}^{h} z_{i,t+m} = \beta_h \sum_{m=0}^{h} \frac{G_{i,t+m} - G_{i,t-1}}{Y_{i,t-1}} + \gamma_h(L) X_{i,t-k} + \alpha_{i,h} + \delta_{t,h} + \varepsilon_{i,t+m}$$

where
$$z_{i,t} \equiv \frac{Z_{i,t} - Z_{i,t-1}}{Z_{i,t-1}}$$
 and Z is either employment rate or pc GDP.

= 200

Identification: Bartik type instrument

$$Bartik_{i,t} = s_i \times \frac{(G_{I,t} - G_{I,t-1})}{Y_{I,t-1}}, \quad s_i = \frac{\overline{G_i}}{\overline{G_I}}$$
 Averages in pre Euro years

Idea: Differential exposure in regions to common national changes.

EL SQA

Identification: Bartik type instrument

$$Bartik_{i,t} = s_i \times \frac{(G_{I,t} - G_{I,t-1})}{Y_{I,t-1}}, \quad s_i = \frac{\overline{G_i}}{\overline{G_I}}$$
 Averages in pre Euro years

Idea: Differential exposure in regions to common national changes.

Assumption: Central governments do not change spending because regions that receive a disproportionate amount of government spending are doing poorly relative to other regions.

JI SOCO

Share *s*_i



Gabriel, Klein, Pessoa

÷

Franco-German Seminar 8/16

Multipliers - Baseline



Cumulative Output Multiplier

▶ Rob. Checks

Cumulative Employment Multiplier

- Government spending output (employment) multiplier of 2.2 (1.4).
- Close to existing estimates e.g., NS (2014): 1.4–2.8 (1.3–2.5).

/ Pub. Employment

Results

IRFs - Supply Side



• Strong crowding-in of private demand via private investment.

Ga	briel	, K	lein,	Pessoa	

Gov. Spending Eurozone

Franco-German Seminar 10 / 16

ъ

Results

IRFs - Wages and Durables Consumption



- Consumption of durables and wages increase.
- Income redistribution towards workers.

IRFs - Labor Margins



- Hours increase is accounted by the extensive rather than by the intensive margin.
- €1 million creates 32 new jobs, 20 in the private sector (cost of €30,000 per job).

Sectoral Decomposition

		G	VA Multip	lier		Employment Multiplier				
	Impact	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	Impact	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years
Panel A: Base	line Speci	fication fo	r the Priva	te Sector						
Multiplier	1.68***	1.87***	1.88***	1.81***	1.72***	1.18***	1.52***	1.56***	1.52***	1.43***
	(0.51)	(0.42)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)
# Obs	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963
Panel B: Mult	tipliers by	Economic	Sectors							
Agriculture	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.09**	-0.14***	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
# Obs	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963
Industry	0.70**	0.66**	0.67***	0.67***	0.66***	0.28***	0.36***	0.39***	0.37***	0.38***
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
# Obs	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963
Construction	0.27**	0.23***	0.23***	0.19***	0.17***	0.33***	0.39***	0.41***	0.35***	0.33***
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
# Obs	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963
Services	0.69***	0.84***	0.82***	0.75***	0.65***	0.49***	0.63***	0.67***	0.67***	0.60***
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)
# Obs	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963
Finance	0.05	0.18	0.19	0.29***	0.40***	0.12*	0.12*	0.08	0.09*	0.08
	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)
# Obs	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963	2621	2457	2293	2129	1963

Notes: Industry includes all industry with the exception of construction. Services combine wholesale, relat, transport, accommodation and food services, information and communication. Finance refers to financial and business services. Here, all estimated multipliers are expressed in terms of GVA because output series are not available at the sectoral level. Therefore, the total multiplier (including all sectors) shows minor differences compared to the baseline output (GDP) multiplier we also exclude GVA of non-market sector as we want to analyze the private sector

Gabriel, Klein, Pessoa

Franco-German Seminar 13 / 16

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲ヨ▶ ▲ヨ▶ ヨヨ のの⊙

Results

Fiscal Spillovers - ϕ_h

$$\begin{split} \sum_{m=0}^{h} z_{i,t+m} = & \beta_h \sum_{m=0}^{h} \left(\frac{G_{i,t+m} - G_{i,t-1}}{Y_{i,t-1}} \right) + \phi_h \sum_{m=0}^{h} \left(\frac{\sum_{j \neq i} w_{i,j,t} (G_{j,t+m} - G_{j,t-1})}{Y_{i,t-1}} \right) \\ & + \gamma_h (\mathcal{L}) X_{i,t-k} + \alpha_{i,h} + \delta_{t,h} + \epsilon_{i,t+m}. \end{split}$$



э 14 / 16 Franco-German Seminar

< 円

= 990

Conclusion

- Substantial impact of regional government spending in the Eurozone
- Relative output multiplier of 2.2, employment 1.4
- Public spending crowds in private investment (productivity gains)
- Strong employment effects through extensive margin
- Sectoral differences yet, small fiscal spillovers

A = N A = N = |= 900

Thank you!

			Pessoa

Gov. Spending Eurozone

Data

Table: Variables Description

Variable Name	Computation	Definition [Source]
GDP <i>pc</i>	GDP / Population	Regional Gross Domestic Product per capita [ARDECO]
Gov. Spending <i>pc</i>	non-market GVA $/$ Population	Regional Gross Value Added of the Non-Market Sector per capita [ARDECO]
Employment Rate	Employment / Population	Total Employment per capita [ARDECO]
Employment		Total Employment [ARDECO]
Hours		Total Hours worked [ARDECO]
Investiment pc	private GFCF/ Population	Total Private (all sectors excluding non-market) Investment per capita (fixed gross capital formation) [ARDECO]
Hourly Wage	Compensation / Hours	Regional average compensation per hour (all sectors) [ARDECO]
Productivity	GVA / Hours	Labor Productivity, value added per hour (all sectors) [ARDECO]
TFP	$TFP_{i,t} = exp(ln(GVA_{i,t}) - 1/3)$	$* \ln(K_{i,t}) - 2/3 * \ln(L_{i,t})$ [ARDECO]
Labor Share	private Compensation / private GVA	Private (all sectors excluding non-market) compensation as a share of private GDP [ARDECO]

< ロ > < 回 > < 三 > < 三 > < 三 > < 三 = < の < ○

Government Spending and GVA



Source: Eurostat, country level data, 1999-2017.

Gov. Spending Eurozone

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲ヨ▶ ▲ヨ▶ ヨヨ のの⊙

Private and Public Employment Multipliers





ъ

Robustness

Back

- Alternative G_{it} and instrument construction (s_i , gov. consumption).
- Unexpected variation in national spending (defense spending, forecast error).
- Sample changes (NUTS 3 level 922 regions, including late adopters, dropping countries).
- Additional controls (national tax policy and sovereign risk premia).



	Output Multiplier						
	Impact	1-Year	2-Years	3-Years	4-Years		
Panel A: Baseline S	pecification						
Multiplier	2.14***	2.33***	2.33***	2.26***	2.21***		
	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.18)		
Panel B: Alternative	e Instrument	Construction	ı				
Alternative <i>s_i</i> (I)	1.89***	2.05***	2.05***	1.99***	1.96***		
	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.18)		
Alternative s _i (II)	1.74***	1.90***	1.84***	1.82***	1.82***		
	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.24)		
National Accounts	2.64***	2.71***	2.72***	2.63***	2.49***		
	(0.57)	(0.30)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.15)		
Panel C: Exogenous	variation in	national spe	nding				
Military Spending	3.27***	3.22***	3.22***	2.99***	2.96***		
	(0.67)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)		
Forecast Errors	3.91***	3.47***	3.03***	2.95***	2.82***		
	(1.02)	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.23)		
Fiscal Rule	2.00***	2.27***	2.34***	2.30***	2.33***		
	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.19)		

Gabriel, Klein, Pessoa

Gov. Spending Eurozone



	Output Multiplier						
	Impact	1-Year	2-Years	3-Years	4-Years		
Panel A: Baseline Spec	ification						
Multiplier	2.14***	2.33***	2.33***	2.26***	2.21***		
	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.18)		
Panel B: Alternative Sa	mples						
NUTS 3 Data	2.64***	2.71***	2.64***	2.57***	2.50***		
	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.12)		
Late Adopter	2.10***	2.28***	2.30***	2.25***	2.20***		
	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.18)		
Panel C: Controlling for	Fiscal Stan	ce					
Country homogeneity	1.95***	2.22***	2.16***	2.03***	2.04***		
	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.22)		
Country heterogeneity	1.65***	2.06***	2.06***	1.92***	2.15***		
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.20)		

State Dependency - Core/Periphery

	Impact	1-Year	2-Years	3-Years	4-Years			
Output Multiplier								
Periphery	1.79***	2.06***	2.10***	2.01***	1.99***			
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.20)			
Core	2.63***	2.66***	2.73***	2.92***	2.90***			
	(0.59)	(0.42)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.21)			
HAC Test	0.11	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.00			
Employment Multiplier								
Periphery	1.04***	1.35***	1.43***	1.34***	1.32***			
	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)			
Core	1.34***	1.68***	1.80***	2.20***	2.28**			
	(0.40)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.17)	(0.18)			
HAC Test	0.29	0.23	0.13	0.00	0.00			



< ロ > < 回 > < 三 > < 三 > < 三 > < 三 = < の < ○

State Dependency - Business Cycle

🕨 Back

	Impact	1-Year	2-Years	3-Years	4-Years		
Output Multiplier							
Recessions	2.57***	2.69***	2.76***	2.74***	2.64***		
	(0.56)	(0.34)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.15)		
Expansions	2.17***	2.45** [*]	2.41** [*]	2.35** [*]	2.33***		
•	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.17)		
HAC Test	0.33	0.36	0.16	0.10	0.14		
	En	nployment	Multiplier				
Recessions	1.44***	1.77***	1.92***	1.97***	1.92***		
	(0.33)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.20)		
Expansions	0.94***	1.29***	1.38***	1.38***	1.33***		
•	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)		
HAC Test	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.09		

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

State Dependency - Sign

🕩 Back

	Impact	1-Year	2-Years	3-Years	4-Years			
Output Multiplier								
Consolidation	2.16*** (0.47)	2.55*** (0.39)	2.42*** (0.30)	2.33*** (0.25)	2.29*** (0.22)			
Stimulus	2.33*** (0.68)	2.33*** (0.59)	2.45*** (0.51)	2.26*** (0.40)	2.36*** (0.29)			
HAC Test	0.77	0.61	0.93	0.79	0.64			
	Em	ployment N	Multiplier					
Consolidation	1.09*** (0.26)	1.47*** (0.12)	1.37*** (0.06)	1.36*** (0.09)	1.32*** (0.12)			
Stimulus	0.97** (0.44)	1.25*** (0.40)	1.43*** (0.44)	1.18*** (0.29)	1.27*** (0.27)			
HAC Test	0.78	0.57	0.90	0.45	0.83 [´]			

Gabriel, Klein, Pessoa

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

Spillovers - own Multipliers β_h



= 990

10/9